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The	  manifest	  and	  the	  philosophical	  image	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  
Johannes	  Roessler	  
	  
[forthcoming	  in	  F.	  Stadler	  &	  C.	  Limbeck-­‐Lilienau	  (eds.),	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Perception	  
and	  Observation:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  40th	  International	  Wittgenstein	  Symposium.	  
2019.	  Berlin:	  de	  Gruyter.]	  
	  
Abstract	  
Explanations	  of	  knowledge	  of	  mind-­‐independent	  objects	  in	  terms	  of	  perception	  can	  
be	  used	  to	  validate	  or	  vindicate	  claims	  to	  knowledge:	  they	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  
for	  thinking	  that	  we	  know	  what	  objects	  are	  like.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  contrast	  two	  ways	  to	  
think	  about	  this	  ‘vindicatory	  role’	  of	  perception.	  The	  majority	  view	  in	  epistemology	  is	  
that	  it	  must	  be	  understood	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  way	  perception	  explains	  and	  
warrants	  beliefs.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  how	  perception	  figures	  in	  our	  ordinary	  
explanatory	  and	  dialectical	  practice.	  As	  ordinarily	  conceived,	  perception’s	  role	  in	  
vindicating	  a	  claim	  to	  knowledge	  that	  p	  turns	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  perceive	  that	  p.	  I	  
suggest	  that	  this	  analysis	  enables	  us	  to	  adjudicate	  some	  entrenched	  disagreements	  
over	  the	  sense,	  if	  any,	  in	  which	  perceptual	  knowledge	  is	  ‘based	  on’	  sensory	  
experience.	  I	  conclude	  with	  a	  suggestion	  about	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  conflict	  
between	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  commonsense	  psychology	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  




Epistemic	  perception,	  perceptual	  experience,	  reason-­‐seeking	  questions,	  attention,	  
perceptual	  recognition,	  epistemology.	  
	  
	  
We	  can	  distinguish	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  perception	  bears	  on	  our	  justification	  for	  claims	  
about	  mind-­‐independent	  objects	  around	  us.	  First,	  it	  is	  a	  familiar	  observation	  that	  the	  
question	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  that	  p?’	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  challenge	  (a	  ‘pointed	  
question’,	  in	  Austin’s	  phrase).	  Used	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  question	  serves	  to	  probe	  the	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addressee’s	  entitlement	  to	  a	  claim	  to	  knowledge	  that	  p,	  often	  in	  response	  to	  her	  
asserting	  or	  telling	  someone	  that	  p.	  In	  effect,	  the	  question	  asks	  for	  a	  reason	  to	  think	  
that	  you	  do	  know	  that	  p.	  And	  it	  seems	  possible	  to	  meet	  that	  request	  —	  to	  vindicate	  
your	  claim	  to	  knowledge	  —	  by	  relating	  your	  knowledge	  that	  p	  to	  your	  current	  or	  past	  
perception.	  Call	  this	  the	  ‘vindicatory	  role’	  of	  perception.	  Second,	  we	  might	  ask	  about	  
your	  justification	  or	  warrant	  for	  believing	  that	  p.	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  believe	  that	  p?’	  is	  
often	  used	  to	  press	  that	  question.	  And	  here	  too	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  a	  good	  
answer	  can	  make	  reference,	  in	  various	  ways,	  to	  your	  current	  or	  past	  perception.	  Call	  
this	  the	  ‘warranting	  role’	  of	  perception.	  	  	  
	  
My	  question	  in	  what	  follows	  is	  how	  the	  two	  sorts	  of	  justificatory	  role	  of	  perception	  
are	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  majority	  view	  in	  recent	  epistemology	  has	  been	  that	  
‘perceptual	  warrant’	  comes	  first	  in	  the	  order	  of	  explanation.	  An	  account	  of	  how	  you	  
know	  that	  the	  tile	  before	  you	  is	  blue	  (when	  you	  know	  this	  by	  sight),	  on	  this	  view,	  
must	  put	  centre	  stage	  the	  explanation	  of	  your	  belief	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue.	  If	  your	  
seeing	  what	  you	  see	  explains	  your	  knowledge	  this	  can	  only	  mean	  that	  it	  causes	  and	  
warrants	  your	  belief,	  and	  that,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  your	  belief	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  amount	  
to	  knowledge.	  Recently,	  however,	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  have	  challenged	  this	  
‘belief-­‐centred’	  analysis,	  and	  offered	  versions	  of	  an	  alternative	  view.	  On	  that	  view,	  
the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  know	  what	  we	  know	  through	  perception	  is	  more	  basic	  than	  
the	  question	  of	  what	  justifies	  or	  warrants	  perceptual	  beliefs,	  at	  least	  in	  cases	  of	  non-­‐
inferential	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  In	  such	  cases,	  we	  should	  approach	  the	  latter	  
question	  in	  the	  light	  of	  our	  answer	  to	  the	  former.	  For	  example,	  the	  correct	  account	  
of	  how	  you	  know	  the	  tile	  is	  blue	  may	  be	  that	  you	  can	  see	  (and	  thus	  know)	  that	  it’s	  
blue.	  That	  account	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	  any	  basis	  for	  your	  belief	  that	  it’s	  blue.	  And	  
we	  should	  be	  drawing	  on	  this	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowledge	  in	  understanding	  your	  
entitlement,	  and	  perhaps	  your	  reason,	  for	  your	  belief.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  obvious	  single	  motivation	  from	  which	  the	  minority	  view	  springs.	  Three	  
distinguished	  philosophers	  —	  Alan	  Millar,	  Barry	  Stroud	  and	  Timothy	  Williamson	  —
have	  proposed	  versions	  of	  it	  in	  recent	  work,	  but	  it	  can	  look	  as	  if	  their	  adherence	  to	  it	  
reflects	  quite	  different	  concerns.	  Williamson’s	  interest	  seems	  to	  lie	  mainly	  in	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applying	  his	  general	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  evidence	  (as	  provided	  by	  knowledge)	  to	  
the	  case	  of	  perceptually	  grounded	  knowledge,	  and	  perhaps	  in	  developing	  his	  view	  of	  
propositional	  knowledge	  as	  a	  determinable	  of	  which	  propositional	  seeing	  is	  a	  
determinate.	  In	  Stroud’s	  work,	  the	  importance	  of	  propositional	  perception	  emerges	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  reflection	  on	  how	  we	  can	  resist	  what	  Stroud	  describes	  as	  a	  
‘restricted’	  conception	  of	  perception	  that	  he	  argues	  leads	  to	  philosophical	  
scepticism.	  Millar	  characterizes	  his	  account	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  as	  
‘commonsensical’.	  One	  inspiration	  is	  Austin’s	  discussion	  of	  ordinary	  discourse	  about	  
knowledge	  and	  perception	  (esp.	  in	  his	  ‘Other	  minds’).	  These	  different	  concerns	  may	  
not	  be	  mutually	  exclusive,	  of	  course,	  and	  in	  any	  case	  I	  think	  there	  is	  substantial	  
agreement	  on	  a	  significant	  point,	  that	  the	  majority	  view	  (which	  accords	  explanatory	  
priority	  to	  ‘perceptual	  warrant’)	  distorts	  the	  way	  perception	  figures	  in	  our	  ordinary	  
explanatory/dialectical	  practice.	  We	  can	  put	  the	  idea	  as	  follows:	   
	  
Epistemic	  Perception	  (EP):	  (a)	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue’	  would	  ordinarily	  
be	  regarded	  as	  a	  satisfactory	  account	  of	  how	  you	  know	  it’s	  blue,	  yet	  (b)	  the	  
account	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	  any	  evidence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  you	  
believe	  the	  tile	  to	  be	  blue.	  
	  
Let	  me	  clarify	  three	  terms.	  First,	  I	  speak	  of	  ‘epistemic’	  perception	  since	  that,	  
according	  to	  Millar,	  Stroud	  and	  Williamson,	  is	  what	  propositional	  perception	  
amounts	  to:	  seeing	  that	  p	  entails	  knowing	  that	  p;	  it	  is	  a	  ‘way	  of	  knowing’	  that	  p.1	  
Second,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘evidence’	  in	  a	  somewhat	  loose	  and	  liberal	  sense	  here.	  There	  
is	  no	  presumption,	  for	  example,	  that	  evidence	  is	  propositional	  or	  that	  beliefs	  based	  
on	  evidence	  are	  inferential	  or	  even	  that	  evidence	  must	  be	  accessible	  to	  the	  subject.	  
What	  matters	  is	  that	  evidence	  provides	  grounds	  for	  belief	  that	  may	  underwrite	  a	  
belief’s	  ‘status	  as	  knowledge’	  and	  in	  that	  way	  explain	  how	  one	  knows	  what	  one	  
knows.	  Third,	  the	  term	  ‘ordinarily’	  raises	  important	  and	  delicate	  issues	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  what	  might	  be	  called	  the	  commonsense	  psychology	  of	  perceptual	  
knowledge.	  Should	  we	  think	  of	  this	  as	  a	  ‘folk	  theory’?	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  it	  exhibit	  
                                                
1   For dissent, see McDowell 2002. For support, see Millar 2011. 
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cultural	  variation?	  How	  can	  we	  discover	  (if	  that	  is	  what	  we	  have	  to	  do)	  its	  content	  
and	  commitments?	  Without	  being	  able	  to	  address	  these	  questions	  adequately	  here,	  
one	  thing	  I	  will	  assume	  is	  that	  some	  understanding	  of	  perception	  and	  its	  role	  in	  
knowledge	  is	  essential	  for	  comprehending	  and	  negotiating	  the	  ‘space	  of	  reasons’.	  
Without	  some	  such	  understanding	  one	  would	  not	  be	  able	  fully	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
practice	  of	  raising	  and	  answering	  ‘reason-­‐seeking’	  questions	  such	  as	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  
believe	  this?’,	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know?’	  or	  ‘Are	  you	  sure?’	  —	  practices	  that	  are	  closely	  
linked	  to	  other	  central	  human	  practices,	  such	  as	  testimony,	  joint	  attention,	  or	  shared	  
reminiscing.	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  its	  more	  or	  less	  obvious	  epistemological	  significance,	  EP	  also	  has	  an	  
important	  bearing	  on	  a	  basic	  question	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  Consider	  John	  
Campbell’s	  suggestion	  that	  ‘(o)rdinary	  common	  sense	  today	  still	  finds	  it	  compelling	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  role	  for	  sensory	  experience	  in	  knowledge.’	  (2014,	  p.	  14)	  
A	  ‘fundamental	  role’,	  I	  take	  it,	  would	  be	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  explanatory	  role:	  it	  is	  
because	  of	  the	  visual	  experience	  you	  enjoy	  of	  the	  tile	  there	  right	  in	  front	  of	  you	  that	  
you	  are	  in	  position	  to	  know	  it’s	  blue,	  or	  so,	  according	  to	  Campbell,	  ordinary	  common	  
sense	  still	  maintains.	  Why	  should	  common	  sense	  be	  assumed	  to	  take	  this	  view?	  
Campbell	  does	  not	  elaborate,	  but	  many	  would	  argue	  the	  answer	  is	  obvious:	  we	  
ordinarily	  think	  of	  sensory	  experience	  as	  what	  justifies	  perceptual	  beliefs	  about	  
objects	  and	  in	  that	  way	  yields	  knowledge	  of	  what	  objects	  are	  like.	  If	  EP	  is	  correct,	  
that	  interpretation	  must	  be	  rejected.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  real	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  
‘fundamental	  role’	  for	  sensory	  experience	  is	  a	  commitment	  of	  ordinary	  explanatory	  
practice	  or	  perhaps	  merely	  a	  tenacious	  piece	  of	  revisionary	  epistemology.	  At	  this	  
point,	  an	  interesting	  internal	  disagreement	  emerges	  between	  two	  ways	  of	  
developing	  EP.	  On	  what	  I	  will	  call	  an	  austere	  reading	  of	  EP	  (encouraged	  by	  some	  of	  
Stroud’s	  and	  Williamson’s	  writings	  on	  perceptual	  knowledge),	  perceptual	  
explanations	  of	  knowledge	  terminate	  in	  attributions	  of	  epistemic	  perception.	  While	  
seeing	  that	  p	  may	  somehow	  involve	  visual	  experience,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  
visual	  knowledge	  is	  based	  on	  such	  experience.	  A	  richer	  reading	  of	  EP	  (encouraged	  by	  
Austin	  and	  Millar)	  would	  be	  more	  hospitable	  to	  Campbell’s	  suggestion.	  On	  it,	  
5 
perceptual	  experience	  of	  objects	  plays	  an	  indispensable	  role	  in	  making	  epistemic	  
perception	  itself	  intelligible.	  	  
	  
My	  discussion	  falls	  into	  three	  parts.	  I	  start	  by	  saying	  more	  about	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  
‘vindicatory	  role’	  for	  perception.	  (Section	  1)	  On	  a	  popular	  view,	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  
that	  p?’	  just	  is	  a	  request	  for	  the	  evidence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  you	  believe	  that	  p.	  I	  
raise	  doubts	  about	  that	  view	  and	  propose	  an	  alternative	  account:	  briefly,	  the	  
question	  is	  a	  request	  for	  a	  ‘vindicatory	  explanation’	  of	  your	  knowing	  that	  p.	  In	  the	  
second	  part	  (sections	  2-­‐4),	  I	  ask	  whether	  appeal	  to	  epistemic	  perception	  can	  provide	  
the	  required	  ‘vindicatory’	  sort	  of	  explanation	  (I	  suggest	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘yes’),	  and	  
whether	  it	  can	  do	  so	  without	  acknowledging	  a	  ‘fundamental	  role	  for	  sensory	  
experience’	  (I	  make	  a	  case	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘no’).	  In	  the	  last	  part	  
(section	  5)	  I	  consider	  where	  the	  correctness	  of	  EP	  would	  leave	  the	  traditional	  
philosophical	  project	  of	  explaining	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us	  in	  terms	  of	  
perception’s	  role	  in	  warranting	  beliefs.	  
	  
1.	  Vindicatory	  explanations	  	  
There	  are	  two	  routes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  that	  p?’	  (henceforth	  
HK)	  must	  be	  a	  request	  for	  your	  evidence	  that	  p.	  One	  route	  argues	  that	  the	  question	  
is	  asking	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowing	  that	  p,	  and	  that	  only	  the	  evidence	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  which	  you	  believe	  that	  p	  can	  deliver	  the	  required	  explanation.	  Advocates	  
of	  EP,	  of	  course,	  reject	  that	  evidentialist	  assumption,	  so	  I	  set	  the	  first	  route	  to	  one	  
side	  for	  the	  moment.	  The	  second	  route	  involves	  reflection	  on	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  
using	  HK	  as	  a	  challenge	  or	  a	  ‘pointed	  question’.	  It	  contends	  that	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐
seeking’	  interpretation	  of	  HK	  is	  the	  only,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  best,	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  challenge.	  	  
	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  second	  route	  is	  Daniel	  Stoljar’s	  discussion	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  two	  
‘versions’	  of	  HK,	  an	  ‘evidence-­‐seeking’	  and	  an	  ‘explanation-­‐seeking’	  version.	  He	  
traces	  the	  distinction	  to	  Austin’s	  discussion	  of	  two	  kinds	  of	  motivations	  for	  asking	  
HK:	  as	  a	  ‘pointed	  question’	  vs	  ‘out	  of	  polite	  curiosity’.	  (Stoljar	  2012,	  see	  Austin	  1961)	  
Stoljar	  does	  not	  spell	  out	  why	  asking	  HK	  ‘pointedly’	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	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using	  it	  as	  a	  request	  for	  evidence,	  but	  I	  take	  it	  the	  idea	  is	  this.	  To	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
challenge,	  HK	  would	  need	  to	  bring	  into	  play	  some	  normative	  question,	  a	  question	  
concerning	  your	  right	  or	  entitlement	  to	  hold	  some	  attitude.	  Now,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘Why	  
do	  you	  believe	  that	  p?’	  (WB),	  it	  is	  obvious	  which	  normative	  question	  is	  in	  play:	  WB	  
itself	  is	  naturally	  and	  routinely	  used	  to	  ask	  for	  your	  normative	  reason	  for	  believing	  
that	  p.	  By	  doing	  so,	  it	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  you	  have	  no	  adequate	  reason;	  as	  
Austin	  says,	  it	  ‘suggests	  that	  perhaps	  you	  oughtn’t	  to	  believe’	  that	  p.	  (Austin	  1961,	  p.	  
78)	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HK,	  things	  are	  more	  complicated.	  Knowledge	  is	  not	  a	  ‘judgement-­‐
sensitive	  attitude’.2	  It	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  request	  your	  normative	  reason	  for	  knowing	  
that	  p.	  Then	  how	  should	  we	  understand	  the	  dialectical	  significance	  of	  the	  question?	  
What	  it	  must	  be	  asking	  for,	  it	  might	  be	  said,	  is	  once	  again	  your	  reason	  and	  
entitlement	  to	  believe	  that	  p.3	  
	  
The	  proposal	  cannot	  be	  quite	  right	  as	  it	  stands,	  though.	  HK	  is	  not	  the	  same	  question	  
as	  WB.	  Its	  subject	  matter	  is	  your	  knowing,	  not	  just	  believing,	  that	  p.	  One	  might	  
accommodate	  this	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  question	  asks	  for	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  belief	  
that	  meets	  a	  further	  condition:	  it	  should	  explain	  your	  knowing	  that	  p.	  At	  this	  point,	  
however,	  we	  should	  ask	  whether	  conceiving	  of	  HK	  as	  a	  request	  for	  an	  explanation	  
may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  account	  for	  its	  ‘pointed’	  character.	  Suppose	  our	  interest	  is	  in	  
whether	  your	  claim	  to	  knowledge	  that	  p	  is	  acceptable	  —	  whether	  there	  is	  good	  
reason	  to	  think	  you	  do	  know	  that	  p.	  Asking	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowing	  that	  p	  
would	  be	  a	  natural	  way	  to	  press	  that	  question.	  Note,	  first,	  that	  quite	  generally	  
requesting	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  q	  can	  be	  a	  way	  to	  seek	  reassurance	  that	  it	  
                                                
2   See Scanlon 1998 for the notion of a judgement-sensitive attitude. 
Austin notes that ‘(w)e seem never to ask “Why do you know?”’ (Austin 1961, p. 78) 
This may reflect our habit of hearing a second-person why-question relating to a 
propositional attitude as a reason-seeking question: a question for which knowledge is 
not an intelligible target. 
3   Marie McGinn relies on this view in defending her unorthodox view 
that in the case of direct observational judgements HK is off-key (more precisely: 
inappropriate as a matter of principle, rather than just, usually, conversationally odd, 
perhaps because of the obviousness of the answer). She writes that ‘it is [in such 
cases], for example, very unclear what I might offer as evidence for the things I 
assert.’ (2011, p. 2) One might agree with this, but question whether evidence is what 
HK must be asking for.  
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is	  true	  that	  q.	  There	  is	  a	  sense,	  of	  course,	  in	  which	  the	  request	  presupposes	  that	  q;	  
there	  would	  be	  nothing	  to	  explain	  unless	  q	  were	  true.	  But	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
the	  question	  makes	  no	  sense	  unless	  the	  questioner	  is	  convinced	  that	  q.	  ‘Why	  would	  
she	  do	  such	  a	  thing?’	  can	  ask	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  an	  action	  that	  would	  
simultaneously	  help	  to	  convince	  a	  sceptic	  that	  the	  act	  in	  question	  happened.	  
Similarly,	  in	  requesting	  an	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowing	  something,	  we	  may,	  as	  
Williamson	  puts	  it,	  ‘politely	  grant’	  that	  you	  do	  know,	  ‘and	  merely	  ask	  how,	  perhaps	  
suspecting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  answer	  to	  the	  question.’	  (2000,	  p.	  253)	  The	  suggestion	  
might	  be	  put	  by	  saying	  that	  HK	  demands	  a	  ‘vindicatory	  explanation’	  of	  your	  knowing	  
that	  p:	  an	  explanation	  that	  would	  show	  that	  your	  attitude	  to	  p	  is	  indeed	  knowledge,	  
not	  (say)	  mere	  belief	  or	  conjecture.4	  This,	  I	  think,	  is	  exactly	  in	  line	  with	  Austin’s	  
observation	  that	  HK,	  when	  used	  ‘pointedly’,	  ‘suggests	  that	  perhaps	  you	  don’t	  know	  it	  
at	  all’.	  (1961,	  p.	  78)	  A	  good	  answer	  is	  expected	  to	  dispel	  that	  suggestion.	  
	  
There	  may	  be	  a	  case	  for	  imposing	  restrictions	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  explanations	  that	  
would	  properly	  engage	  with	  HK,	  but	  this	  provides	  no	  support	  for	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐
seeking’	  interpretation.	  One	  such	  restriction	  seems	  to	  be	  implicit	  in	  the	  phrase	  
‘vindicatory	  explanation’.	  Consider	  the	  explanatory	  role	  of	  interests.	  Your	  knowing	  
the	  date	  of	  the	  battle	  of	  Montaperti	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  your	  passion	  for	  medieval	  
history.	  It’s	  because	  of	  your	  interest	  that	  you	  came	  to	  know	  this.	  That	  may	  be	  a	  
perfectly	  satisfactory	  (partial)	  explanation,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  by	  itself	  give	  us	  much	  of	  a	  
reason	  to	  think	  that	  what	  you	  have	  is	  knowledge.	  Conspiracy	  theories	  equally	  reflect	  
the	  subject’s	  keen	  interests.	  It	  is	  not	  implausible	  to	  think	  that	  it’s	  because	  of	  this	  that	  
appeal	  to	  interests	  would	  not	  be	  a	  fully	  satisfactory	  answer	  to	  HK.	  What	  the	  question	  
is	  seeking	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowing	  that	  p	  in	  terms	  of	  factors	  that	  make	  it	  
                                                
4   See Stroud’s discussion of the sense in which a successful account of 
how we know what we know should be ‘legitimating’, insofar as it should enable us 
‘to understand that what we have got is knowledge of, or reasonable belief in, the 
world’s being a certain way.’ (Stroud 2000, p. 152) I borrow the term ‘vindicatory 
explanation’ from David Wiggins’s use of the term in connection with explanations 
that account for someone’s believing something in a way that implies the truth of their 
belief. (Wiggins 1996) 
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clear	  that	  your	  attitude	  to	  p	  is	  knowledge.5	  A	  further	  restriction	  we	  might	  consider	  is	  
that	  HK	  asks	  for	  an	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  means	  or	  method	  for	  finding	  out	  
whether	  p.	  Compare	  Ayer’s	  suggestion	  that	  ‘(n)ormally	  we	  do	  not	  say	  that	  people	  
know	  things	  unless	  they	  have	  followed	  one	  of	  the	  accredited	  routes	  to	  knowledge.’	  
(1956,	  p.	  33)	  Even	  if	  these	  restrictions	  can	  be	  corroborated,	  though,	  they	  lend	  no	  
immediate	  support	  to	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐seeking’	  interpretation.	  You	  might	  argue	  that	  
only	  evidence	  delivers	  vindicatory	  explanations	  of	  knowledge,	  or	  that	  only	  evidence	  
amounts	  to	  an	  ‘accredited	  route	  to	  knowledge’.	  But	  that	  would	  be	  to	  adopt	  the	  first	  
route	  to	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐seeking’	  interpretation	  I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning.	  It	  would	  
be	  to	  argue	  that	  only	  evidence	  can	  provide	  the	  thing	  HK	  is	  requesting,	  viz.	  a	  certain	  
kind	  of	  explanation	  of	  your	  knowing	  that	  p.	   
	  
The	  upshot	  is	  that	  HK	  is	  a	  ‘reason-­‐seeking’	  question	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (a	  request	  for	  a	  
reason	  to	  think	  you	  know	  that	  p),	  not	  just	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  reason-­‐seeking	  question	  
‘Why	  do	  you	  believe	  that	  p?’	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  consider	  Sellars’s	  well-­‐known	  claim	  
that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  position	  in	  the	  ‘logical	  space	  of	  reasons,	  of	  justifying	  and	  being	  
able	  to	  justify	  what	  one	  says’	  (Sellars	  1956,	  pp.	  298-­‐9).	  The	  passage	  is	  usually	  
interpreted	  as	  expressing	  a	  commitment	  to	  epistemological	  internalism.	  If	  you	  know	  
that	  p	  you	  should	  normally	  be	  able	  to	  cite	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	  ‘knowledge-­‐
providing’	  reason,	  viz.	  a	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  that	  would	  help	  to	  underwrite	  
the	  status	  of	  your	  belief	  as	  knowledge	  and	  would	  in	  that	  way	  explain	  how	  you	  know	  
that	  p.	  (See	  e.g.	  McDowell	  2011	  for	  that	  reading.)	  This	  may	  well	  be	  the	  intended	  
reading,	  but	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  Sellars’s	  formulation	  —	  ‘justifying	  what	  one	  says’	  —
	  is	  open	  to	  a	  perfectly	  natural	  alternative	  construal.	  If	  you	  tell	  us	  that	  p,	  and	  we	  
pointedly	  ask	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know?’,	  a	  good	  answer	  to	  our	  question	  would	  
corroborate	  the	  claim	  to	  knowledge	  that’s	  implicit	  in	  your	  act	  of	  telling	  and	  would	  
thus	  ‘justify	  what	  you	  say’.	  The	  passage	  from	  Sellars,	  in	  other	  words,	  may	  be	  read	  as	  
                                                
5   If this is right, we would need to revisit the question whether there is 
after all a distinction to be drawn between two ‘versions’ of HK: a ‘dialectical’ 
version (requesting a vindicatory explanation) and a ‘merely biographical’ version 
(asking for any kind of explanation, perhaps equivalent to ‘How come you know that 
p?’ or ‘What explains your knowing that p?’). I am inclined to think the answer is 
‘no’ (HK quite generally expects a vindicatory explanation, even when the audience 
needs no convincing that you know that p) but I won’t pursue the matter here.  
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suggesting	  that	  possession	  of	  propositional	  knowledge	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  offer	  
vindicatory	  explanations	  of	  one’s	  knowledge.	  One	  reason	  the	  difference	  matters	  is	  
that	  on	  this	  latter	  reading,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  slogan	  advocates	  of	  EP	  need	  to	  
object	  to.	  What	  they	  will	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  takes	  a	  ‘knowledge-­‐providing’	  reason	  
(or	  any	  sort	  of	  warrant-­‐conferring	  basis	  for	  belief)	  to	  validate	  a	  claim	  to	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
2.	  Epistemic	  perception	  
It	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  have	  three	  responses	  to	  EP	  before	  us.	  First,	  here,	  again,	  is	  EP	  
itself:	  
	  
Epistemic	  Perception	  (EP):	  (a)	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue’	  would	  ordinarily	  
be	  regarded	  as	  a	  satisfactory	  account	  of	  how	  you	  know	  it’s	  blue,	  yet	  (b)	  the	  
account	  makes	  no	  reference	  to	  any	  evidence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  you	  
believe	  the	  tile	  to	  be	  blue.	  
	  
And	  here	  are	  the	  three	  responses,	  from	  an	  ‘evidentialist’	  opponent	  and	  from	  
advocates	  of	  the	  austere	  vs	  the	  richer	  reading	  of	  EP,	  respectively:	  
	  
(1) EP	  cannot	  be	  right:	  without	  some	  grasp	  of	  the	  epistemic	  basis	  in	  virtue	  of	  
which	  perceptual	  beliefs	  qualify	  as	  knowledge	  we	  could	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  
think	  that	  what	  we	  get	  from	  perception	  is	  knowledge.	  While	  (a)	  may	  be	  
correct,	  (b)’s	  gloss	  on	  (a)	  must	  be	  rejected.	  One	  way	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  
insist	  that	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue’	  is	  the	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  a	  ‘belief-­‐
independent’	  perceptual	  state	  that	  may	  be	  one’s	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  
the	  tile	  is	  blue,	  such	  that	  one	  knows	  it’s	  blue	  because	  one	  believes	  it’s	  blue	  
for	  that	  reason.	  (McDowell	  2011)	  Another	  option	  would	  be	  to	  think	  of	  
propositional	  perception	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  promissory	  note.	  To	  say	  that	  you	  can	  see	  
the	  tile	  to	  be	  blue	  is	  to	  say	  that	  a	  more	  detailed	  perceptual	  explanation	  of	  
your	  knowledge,	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  perceptual	  evidence,	  is	  in	  the	  
offing.	  
(2) EP	  is	  correct:	  we	  find	  our	  possession	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  around	  us	  
intelligible	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘ways	  of	  knowing’	  provided	  by	  propositional	  
10 
perception	  in	  various	  modalities.	  Such	  explanations	  have	  (to	  borrow	  a	  term	  
from	  Cassam	  2007)	  a	  distinctive	  ‘finality’.	  There	  is	  nothing	  to	  add	  to	  the	  
statement	  that	  you	  know	  the	  tile	  to	  be	  blue	  because	  you	  can	  see	  that	  it’s	  
blue,	  except	  perhaps	  the	  negative	  point	  that	  you	  can	  see	  this	  without	  
inference.	  (Occasionally	  we	  say	  that	  someone	  is	  able	  to	  see	  that	  p	  when	  she	  
more	  or	  less	  automatically	  infers	  that	  p	  from	  visually	  manifest	  evidence,	  as	  
when	  the	  milk	  bottles	  piling	  up	  in	  your	  neighbour’s	  porch	  enable	  you	  to	  see	  
that	  she	  is	  away,	  or	  the	  presence	  of	  her	  car	  that	  she	  is	  not.	  In	  such	  cases,	  of	  
course,	  the	  subject’s	  possession	  of	  knowledge	  is	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  evidence	  that	  constitutes	  her	  reason	  for	  the	  relevant	  belief.)	  	  
(3) EP	  is	  correct	  so	  far	  as	  it	  goes,	  but	  it	  leaves	  out	  an	  important	  dimension	  of	  our	  
ordinary	  understanding	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  That	  you	  can	  see	  the	  tile	  to	  
be	  blue	  is	  not	  something	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  regard	  as	  the	  last	  word	  on	  how	  
you	  know	  that	  it	  is	  blue.	  There	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  factors	  that	  render	  epistemic	  
perception	  itself	  intelligible:	  (i)	  our	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  objects	  and	  (ii)	  
our	  exercising	  certain	  standing	  abilities,	  e.g.	  the	  ability	  to	  tell	  whether	  
something	  is	  a	  tile,	  or	  whether	  it’s	  blue,	  when	  you	  see	  it,	  under	  favourable	  
conditions.	  There	  is	  a	  sense,	  then,	  in	  which	  epistemic	  perception	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  
promissory	  note.	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  take	  a	  ‘belief-­‐
centred’	  explanation	  to	  redeem	  the	  promise.	  We	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  ability	  
non-­‐inferentially	  to	  perceive	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  
certain	  perceptual-­‐epistemic	  capacities,	  to	  tell	  the	  features	  of	  things	  or	  to	  
recognize	  or	  identify	  things	  as	  falling	  under	  certain	  kinds	  or	  as	  certain	  
individuals.	  
	  
It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  the	  disagreement	  here	  is	  not	  about	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  
satisfactory	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  It’s	  about	  the	  correct	  
analysis	  of	  ordinary	  explanatory	  practice,	  and	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  reasons	  we	  
ordinarily	  take	  ourselves	  to	  have	  for	  thinking	  that	  we	  know	  what	  perceived	  objects	  
are	  like.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	  therefore,	  that	  advocates	  of	  the	  explanatory	  priority	  of	  
‘perceptual	  warrant’	  at	  the	  level	  of	  epistemological	  theorizing	  are	  committed	  to	  (1).	  
Perhaps	  they	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  understanding	  our	  ordinary	  reasons	  for	  claims	  to	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perceptual	  knowledge,	  or	  perhaps	  they	  may	  even	  accept	  some	  version	  of	  EP,	  with	  
the	  proviso	  that	  ultimately	  our	  entitlement	  to	  claims	  to	  perceptual	  knowledge	  can	  
only	  be	  understood	  (and	  corroborated)	  by	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  perceptual	  
warrant.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  idea	  in	  section	  5.	  My	  immediate	  question	  is	  how	  we	  
should	  understand	  the	  disagreement	  between	  (2)	  and	  (3).	  	  
	  
I	  suggested	  that	  there	  are	  traces	  of	  (2)	  in	  some	  of	  Stroud’s	  and	  Williamson’s	  recent	  
writings	  on	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  The	  textual	  evidence	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear-­‐cut,	  but	  
there	  are	  passages	  that	  encourage	  the	  suggestion	  that	  perceptual	  explanations	  of	  
knowledge	  simply	  identify	  a	  way	  in	  which	  we	  know	  what	  we	  know,	  without	  adverting	  
to	  any	  explanatory	  factors	  external	  to	  our	  knowledge.	  A	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  
motivation	  for	  this,	  I	  think,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  what	  Stroud	  and	  Williamson	  see	  as	  the	  
disastrous	  consequences	  of	  giving	  conscious	  perceptual	  experience	  any	  kind	  of	  
‘external’	  explanatory	  or	  vindicatory	  role.	  Consider	  Stroud’s	  discussion	  of	  what	  he	  
calls	  ‘objectual	  perception’.	  He	  argues	  that	  your	  perceiving	  an	  object	  is	  not	  sufficient	  
for	  explaining	  how	  you	  know	  what	  the	  object	  is	  like:	  ‘(y)ou	  can	  perceive	  an	  object	  
without	  knowing	  anything	  about	  it;	  without	  even	  having	  any	  beliefs	  about	  it.’	  That	  
seems	  right,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  a	  view	  on	  which	  ‘objectual	  perception’	  
nevertheless	  plays	  an	  indispensable	  explanatory	  role,	  in	  tandem	  with	  other	  factors.	  
This	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  Stroud’s	  view,	  however.6	  He	  moves	  directly	  from	  the	  
insufficiency	  of	  ‘objectual	  perception’	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ‘(t)he	  kind	  of	  perception	  
[that]	  is	  needed	  to	  account	  for	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  is	  therefore	  what	  might	  be	  
called	  propositional	  perception.’	  (Stroud	  2009,	  p.	  565)	  That	  conclusion,	  I	  think,	  
reflects	  Stroud’s	  resistance	  to	  giving	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  objects	  (and	  
thus	  ‘objectual	  perception’)	  what	  Campbell	  calls	  a	  ‘fundamental	  role’	  in	  making	  
perceptual	  knowledge	  intelligible.	  Elsewhere	  Stroud	  puts	  this	  as	  follows:	  
                                                
6   ‘Seeing that the cat is on the mat typically involves seeing that cat and 
seeing the mat. But when I see only that it is foggy everywhere, for instance I see and 
thereby know that that is how things are, but it could be that I do not see any objects 
at all.’ (2011a, 93) There are also passages, however, that point in the direction of (3). 
Consider Stroud’s remark that ‘the kind of perceptual knowledge I want to draw 
attention to requires a capacity to recognize, in the right circumstances, that an item 
now within your awareness falls, or does not fall, under a concept you are master of 
and understand.’ (2011a, p. 95)  
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‘I	  think	  a	  person	  can	  sometimes	  see,	  for	  example,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  red	  tomato	  
on	  a	  white	  plate	  right	  before	  him,	  and	  in	  that	  way	  he	  knows	  it	  is	  so.	  	  It	  is	  not	  
that	  he	  knows	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  experience	  he	  is	  having.	  	  No	  experience	  
serves	  as	  his	  ground	  or	  reason	  for	  claiming	  or	  judging	  as	  he	  does.’	  (Stroud	  
2013,	  p.	  4)	  
	  
There	  are	  some	  indications	  that	  Williamson	  shares	  this	  view:	  
	  
‘what	  the	  speaker	  is	  reporting	  [when	  she	  explains	  how	  she	  knows	  that	  p	  by	  
saying	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  p’]	  is	  not	  an	  experience	  somehow	  prior	  to	  knowledge,	  
but	  simply	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  knowledge:	  visual	  knowledge.’	  (Williamson	  
2009,	  p.	  348)	  
	  
Admittedly,	  Williamson	  observes	  that	  ‘if	  required,	  a	  much	  fuller	  account	  could	  be	  
given	  of	  how	  one	  sees	  that	  there	  is	  a	  red	  cube	  before	  one’	  (2009,	  p.	  359,	  my	  
emphasis).	  Again,	  Stroud	  notes	  that	  epistemic	  perception	  ‘typically	  involve(s)	  
perceiving	  one	  or	  more	  objects.’	  (Stroud	  2009,	  p.	  565,	  my	  emphasis;	  but	  see	  
footnote	  7	  above.)	  Both	  seem	  happy	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  our	  
ordinary	  thinking	  about	  perception	  than	  can	  be	  captured	  by	  listing	  concepts	  of	  
epistemic	  perception	  in	  the	  various	  modalities	  or	  by	  saying	  that	  perceiving	  is	  a	  way	  
of	  knowing.	  What	  they	  appear	  to	  deny	  is	  that	  any	  of	  this	  further	  material	  is	  of	  much	  
interest	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  understanding	  how	  you	  know	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue,	  or	  
understanding	  our	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  your	  attitude	  is	  knowledge.	  To	  avoid	  the	  
blind	  alleys	  of	  classical	  foundationalism	  we	  need	  to	  discard	  the	  whole	  idea	  that	  our	  
knowledge	  can	  be	  made	  intelligible	  by	  reference	  to	  sensory	  experience	  ‘somehow	  
prior	  to	  knowledge’.	  	  
	  
The	  trouble	  is	  that	  this	  picture	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘vindicatory’	  
character	  or	  function	  of	  perceptual	  explanations	  of	  knowledge.	  Consider	  first	  a	  
general	  challenge	  to	  EP	  that	  advocates	  of	  (1)	  will	  wish	  to	  press.	  What	  makes	  
perceptual	  explanations	  of	  knowledge	  ‘vindicatory’?	  According	  to	  (1),	  there	  is	  a	  
13 
ready-­‐made	  general	  model	  for	  understanding	  our	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  you	  know	  
the	  tile	  is	  blue.	  The	  model	  also	  applies,	  for	  example,	  to	  our	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  
the	  attitude	  you	  acquire	  by	  competent	  deductive	  inference	  from	  known	  premises	  is	  
knowledge.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  attribution	  of	  knowledge	  is	  compelling	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
our	  understanding	  of	  your	  grounds	  for	  belief.	  Call	  this	  a	  ‘generalist’	  approach	  to	  the	  
vindicatory	  role	  of	  perception.	  While	  ‘internalist’	  and	  ‘externalist’	  theories	  of	  
warrant	  offer	  competing	  articulations	  of	  the	  general	  model,	  they	  are	  agreed	  that	  
some	  such	  model	  is	  needed	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  reasons	  for	  crediting	  ourselves	  and	  
others	  with	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  It	  must	  be	  possible,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  state	  and	  
understand	  our	  reasons	  by	  the	  use	  of	  general	  epistemic	  concepts,	  for	  example	  by	  
saying	  that	  perception	  provides	  us	  with	  ‘justifying	  reasons	  for	  belief’	  or	  constitutes	  a	  
‘reliable	  belief-­‐forming	  process’.	  	  
	  
The	  challenge	  facing	  EP	  is	  to	  formulate	  a	  ‘particularist’	  alternative.	  (3)	  promises	  to	  
meet	  that	  challenge	  by	  reference	  to	  ‘specialized’	  perceptual-­‐epistemic	  abilities.	  Our	  
reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  your	  attitude	  is	  knowledge	  turns	  on	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  
ability	  you	  exercise	  in	  acquiring	  the	  attitude,	  as	  an	  ability	  visually	  to	  recognize	  —	  that	  
is,	  come	  to	  know	  —	  whether	  something	  is	  a	  tile.	  Whether	  such	  abilities	  can	  carry	  the	  
explanatory	  weight	  (3)	  places	  on	  them	  is	  a	  good	  question,	  to	  which	  I	  will	  turn	  in	  a	  
moment.	  (2),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would	  suggest	  that	  ‘She	  can	  see	  (or	  otherwise	  
perceive)	  that	  p’	  is	  all	  the	  reassurance	  we	  can	  offer	  in	  response	  to	  ‘How	  does	  she	  
know	  that	  p?’	  (when	  she	  knows	  that	  p	  through	  perception).	  You	  might	  say	  that	  
conversational	  patterns	  bear	  this	  out.	  As	  Paul	  Snowdon	  observes,	  ‘we	  treat	  it	  as	  
totally	  unproblematic	  that	  someone’s	  knowledge	  that	  p	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  saying	  
they	  saw	  that	  p.’	  (Snowdon	  1998)	  But	  note	  that	  Snowdon	  presumably	  means	  ‘by	  
truly	  saying	  (i.e.	  by	  invoking	  the	  fact	  that)	  they	  saw	  that	  p’.	  Arguably,	  the	  claim	  that	  
they	  did	  see	  that	  p	  is	  not	  something	  we	  generally	  treat	  as	  totally	  unproblematic.	  
There	  are	  familiar	  ways	  to	  probe	  claims	  to	  epistemic	  perception,	  such	  as	  ‘How	  can	  
you	  tell?’	  or	  ‘Are	  you	  sure?’	  —	  unsurprisingly,	  given	  that	  there	  are	  familiar	  ways	  in	  
which	  claims	  to	  epistemic	  perception	  can	  be	  mistaken.	  It	  seems,	  then,	  that	  
commonsense	  psychology	  is	  not	  indifferent	  to	  the	  enabling	  conditions	  of	  epistemic	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perception,	  and	  that	  its	  concern	  with	  these	  conditions	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  
questioning	  and	  corroborating	  claims	  to	  knowledge.	  	  
	  
Defenders	  of	  (2)	  might	  consider	  another	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  ‘vindicatory’	  role	  of	  
perception.	  To	  see	  that	  p,	  as	  Williamson	  says,	  is	  to	  know	  that	  p	  ‘by	  sight’.	  (2009,	  p.	  
348)	  This	  suggests	  that	  ‘I	  can	  see	  that	  p’	  after	  all	  invokes	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  
external	  to	  your	  knowing	  that	  p,	  and	  that	  our	  reason	  for	  thinking	  you	  do	  know	  that	  p	  
turns	  on	  that	  factor.	  Roughly:	  it	  is	  because	  you	  acquired	  your	  attitude	  by	  sight	  that	  it	  
can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  knowledge.	  On	  this	  analysis,	  ‘I	  saw	  that	  p’	  seems	  akin	  to	  ‘by	  
inference’	  or	  ‘someone	  told	  me’.	  In	  all	  three	  cases,	  we	  make	  good	  our	  claim	  to	  
knowledge	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  source	  from	  which	  the	  knowledge	  flows.	  In	  
many	  contexts,	  this	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  perfectly	  adequate	  reply	  to	  HK,	  and	  your	  
inability	  to	  recall	  any	  particulars	  would	  not	  surprise	  anyone.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  
would	  ordinarily	  take	  it	  for	  granted,	  in	  all	  three	  cases,	  that	  a	  more	  informative	  or	  
fine-­‐grained	  explanation	  could	  be	  given,	  or	  would	  have	  been	  available	  to	  you	  at	  the	  
time	  you	  acquired	  your	  knowledge.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  circumstances	  in	  which	  only	  
a	  more	  detailed	  account	  could	  successfully	  corroborate	  your	  claim	  to	  knowledge.	  If	  
we	  think	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  p,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  sensible	  to	  accept	  your	  
claim	  to	  knowledge	  that	  p	  without	  considering	  who	  told	  you	  that	  p,	  or	  which	  
argument	  led	  you	  to	  conclude	  that	  p,	  or	  how	  you	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
see	  that	  p.7	  
                                                
7   Uncompromising defenders of (2) might at this point be tempted to 
reject the assumption that HK is a request for a vindicatory explanation of your 
knowing that p. Inspired by elements of Williamson’s account of knowledge as the 
most general factive mental state, they might suggest that HK asks for the specific 
way in which you know (which need not be a way of ‘coming to know’), and that the 
dialectical force of HK is to be understood in terms of the fact that ways of knowing 
that p are determinates of the determinable knowing that p. The idea would be that by 
identifying the way in which one knows that p one vindicates one’s claim to 
knowledge that p in much the same way as the observation that an object is blue 
serves to corroborate the claim that it is coloured. (Williamson’s remark that ‘How do 
you know?’ ‘presupposes that somehow you do know’ (2000, p. 152, my emphasis) 
might be read in this way.) I see two sorts of problems with this suggestion. First, 
there are problems with the notion of ways of knowing. For example, since ‘I regret 
that p’ is not a good answer to HK, not any kind of factive mental state would seem to 
qualify as a ‘way of knowing’, in the technical sense, and it is not obvious how that 
sense is to be regimented. (See Cassam 2009). Williamson counts ‘remembering that 
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In	  summary,	  an	  austere	  version	  of	  EP,	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  (2),	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  get	  to	  
the	  bottom	  of	  the	  reasons	  we	  ordinarily	  have	  (or	  think	  we	  have)	  for	  crediting	  
ourselves	  and	  others	  with	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  I	  now	  consider	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  
richer	  version	  of	  EP,	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  (3).	  In	  section	  4,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  question	  
whether	  perceptual	  knowledge	  depends	  on	  sensory	  experience	  ‘somehow	  prior	  to	  
knowledge’.	  	  
	  
3.	  Perceptual	  recognition	  
Consider	  Austin’s	  list	  of	  statements	  that	  would	  ordinarily	  be	  regarded	  as	  good	  
answers	  to	  the	  question	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  there	  is	  a	  bittern	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
garden?’:	  
	  
(a) I	  was	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  fens.	  
(b) I	  heard	  it.	  
(c) The	  keeper	  reported	  it.	  
(d) By	  its	  booming.	  	  
(e) From	  the	  booming	  noise.	  
(f) Because	  it	  is	  booming.	  
	  
Setting	  aside	  (c),	  these	  statements	  seem	  to	  presuppose	  that	  your	  knowledge	  can	  be	  
explained	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  acquired	  skill	  (see	  a)	  of	  telling	  whether	  something	  is	  a	  
bittern	  by	  its	  call	  (see	  d-­‐f),	  the	  exercise	  of	  which	  requires	  the	  perceptual	  presence	  of	  
                                                                                                                                       
p’ as a way of knowing that p, but this is surely not straightforward. ‘I remember that 
p’ hardly provides a fully adequate answer to HK. (On my interpretation of HK this is 
unsurprising: that you were able to retain your knowledge sheds no light on how you 
were able to acquire it.) Second, the interpretation of HK as a request for a ‘way of 
knowing’, in the stipulated sense of a determinate of the determinable ‘knowledge’, 
looks less promising when we look at languages other than English. Questions that 
perform the dialectical role HK plays in English include ‘Whence do you know that p? 
(Woher weißt du das? Nereden biliyorsun?) and ‘How do you manage to know that 
p?’ (Come fai a saperlo?) These questions seem straightforwardly to request a (certain 
kind of) explanation of your knowing that p.  
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the	  object	  (see	  b).	  Now,	  if	  reflection	  on	  examples	  like	  this	  is	  to	  help	  elaborate	  and	  
defend	  (3),	  it	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  two	  conditions	  can	  be	  met	  (and	  reconciled):	  
	  
(i) Knowledge	  gained	  by	  perceptual	  recognition	  is	  not	  (always)	  inferential.	  
Telling	  that	  something	  is	  F	  ‘from’	  (or	  ‘by’)	  some	  mark	  or	  characteristic	  set	  of	  
features	  may	  occasionally	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  first	  acquiring	  perceptual	  
knowledge	  that	  the	  thing	  shows	  the	  relevant	  mark	  or	  features,	  and	  then	  
inferring	  that	  it	  is	  F,	  hence	  coming	  to	  believe	  it	  is	  F	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  it	  has	  
the	  relevant	  mark.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  how	  perceptual	  recognition	  works	  in	  basic,	  
paradigmatic	  cases.	  Note	  that	  what	  is	  being	  exercised,	  in	  the	  inferential	  case,	  
is	  not	  a	  ‘dedicated’	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  capacity	  but	  simply	  the	  ‘general	  
purpose’	  capacity	  to	  be	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  one’s	  epistemic	  reasons.	  
Admittedly,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  straightforward,	  in	  any	  given	  case,	  to	  say	  whether	  
the	  resulting	  knowledge	  depends	  on	  inference.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  bittern,	  for	  
example,	  the	  matter	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  question	  whether,	  as	  Austin	  seems	  
to	  suggest,	  you	  can	  hear	  the	  bittern	  itself,	  or	  merely	  the	  booming	  noise	  it	  
makes.	  I’ll	  skirt	  this	  issue	  by	  reverting	  to	  visual	  examples.	  What	  matters	  is	  
that	  in	  basic	  cases,	  appeal	  to	  perceptual	  recognition	  explains	  how	  we	  are	  able	  
to	  perceive	  what	  an	  object	  is	  like	  without	  invoking	  our	  belief	  and	  its	  
epistemic	  basis.	   
(ii) Your	  capacity	  visually	  to	  tell	  whether	  something	  is	  a	  tile,	  or	  blue,	  is	  not	  a	  
mere	  disposition	  or	  ‘power’	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  of	  whether	  it’s	  a	  tile,	  or	  
blue;	  it	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  you	  have	  that	  disposition.	  The	  problem	  with	  a	  
dispositional	  interpretation	  is	  that	  the	  explanatory	  value	  of	  capacities	  for	  
perceptual	  recognition	  would	  be	  extremely	  limited.	  As	  Alan	  Millar	  puts	  it,	  
appeal	  to	  such	  capacities	  would	  look	  like	  ‘explaining	  why	  people	  fall	  asleep	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  having	  taken	  a	  drug	  with	  the	  power	  to	  make	  someone	  fall	  
asleep.’	  It	  would	  amount	  to	  invoking	  ‘some	  power	  or	  other	  —	  we	  know	  not	  
what	  	  —	  to	  acquire	  such	  knowledge’.	  (Millar	  2008,	  p.	  336)	  Invocations	  of	  
occult	  powers	  of	  knowledge-­‐acquisition,	  of	  course,	  would	  hardly	  provide	  a	  
fully	  satisfactory	  way	  to	  corroborate	  claims	  to	  knowledge.	  On	  a	  dispositional	  
analysis,	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  capacities	  would	  really	  just	  be	  another	  sort	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of	  promissory	  note,	  to	  be	  redeemed,	  presumably,	  by	  some	  kind	  of	  underlying	  
belief-­‐centred	  explanation.	  (Perhaps	  a	  reliabilist	  analysis	  of	  perceptual	  telling	  
à	  la	  Goldman	  (1976).) 
	  
Millar’s	  response	  to	  the	  ‘virtus	  dormitiva’	  objection	  is	  that	  a	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  
capacity,	  as	  ordinarily	  conceived,	  is	  not	  a	  disposition	  but	  an	  ability	  ‘that	  has	  a	  certain	  
structure’.	  Visually	  identifying	  a	  finch,	  for	  example,	  involves	  being	  ‘responsive	  to	  the	  
shape	  of	  the	  bird,	  its	  size,	  how	  it	  moves,	  and	  so	  on’	  (2008,	  p.	  336)	  —	  to	  features	  that	  
constitute	  the	  distinctive	  visual	  appearance	  of	  a	  finch.8	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  explain	  
what	  this	  ‘responsiveness’	  comes	  to,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  inference.	  There	  is	  also	  
another	  question:	  what	  sort	  of	  ‘structure’,	  if	  any,	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  present	  in	  cases	  
where	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	  ‘from	  which’	  we	  tell	  what	  an	  object	  is	  like	  (for	  
example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  recognizing	  an	  object’s	  shape	  or	  colour)?	  Progress	  with	  these	  
questions	  can	  be	  made,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest,	  by	  comparing	  and	  contrasting	  perceptual	  
recognition,	  as	  ordinarily	  conceived,	  with	  examples	  of	  what	  might	  be	  called	  ‘implicit’	  
or	  ‘opaque’	  perceptual	  telling.	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  three	  kinds	  of	  differences,	  
corresponding	  to	  three	  elements	  of	  the	  (non-­‐inferential)	  ‘structure’	  that	  makes	  
ordinary	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  capacities	  richly	  explanatory.	  
	  
Perceptual	  attention.	  Compare	  a	  perceptual	  judgement	  —	  ‘that	  tile	  is	  blue’	  —	  with	  a	  
‘blindseer’s’	  statement	  ‘it’s	  blue’,	  said	  in	  response	  to	  the	  experimenter’s	  request	  to	  
guess	  whether	  an	  object	  placed	  in	  the	  patient’s	  blind	  field	  is	  blue.	  A	  salient	  feature	  of	  
the	  latter	  case	  is	  that	  while	  a	  blindseer	  is	  able	  reliably	  to	  guess	  what	  an	  object	  in	  her	  
blind	  field	  is	  like,	  her	  ability	  strikes	  us,	  and	  her,	  as	  completely	  mysterious.	  Vision	  
science	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  ability	  is	  underpinned	  by	  ‘implicitly	  processed’	  visual	  
information,	  but	  neither	  the	  subject	  herself	  nor	  commonsense	  psychology	  in	  general	  
have	  any	  insight	  into	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  guesswork,	  not	  even	  into	  whether	  vision	  has	  
anything	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  We	  experience	  no	  such	  puzzlement	  in	  the	  case	  of	  your	  
judgment	  ‘that	  tile	  is	  blue’.	  Unlike	  the	  blindseer	  you	  can	  see	  the	  thing	  you	  are	  talking	  
about,	  and	  	  doing	  so	  enables	  you	  visually	  to	  attend	  to	  it.	  According	  to	  one	  tradition	  
                                                
8   Or perhaps a determinate of the determinable ‘the distinctive visual 
appearance of a finch.’ See Price 1953,	  esp.	  p.	  54,	  for	  discussion.	   
18 
in	  philosophical	  writings	  on	  attention,	  attending	  to	  a	  perceptually	  presented	  object	  
provides	  a	  means	  for	  answering	  questions	  about	  the	  object.9	  I	  think	  this	  captures	  
precisely	  the	  difference	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  see	  between	  sight	  and	  blindsight.	  It’s	  
partly	  in	  the	  light	  of	  that	  ‘means’	  that	  we	  find	  your	  judgement	  about	  the	  tile	  (and	  the	  
knowledge	  it	  expresses)	  intelligible.	  Perceptual	  attention	  to	  an	  experienced	  object	  is	  
not	  a	  ‘means’	  blindseers	  have	  at	  their	  disposal.10	  	  That,	  plausibly,	  is	  why	  their	  ability	  
delivers,	  at	  least	  most	  immediately,	  mere	  guesswork,	  not	  perceptual	  knowledge.	   
	  
Sensory	  appearances.	  It’s	  a	  time-­‐honoured	  theme	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  perceptual	  
recognition	  that	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  articulate	  the	  appearances	  to	  which	  a	  perceptual	  
judgement	  is	  responsive.	  Consider	  Leibniz’s	  illustration	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘confused	  
perception’:	  ‘we	  see	  that	  painters	  and	  other	  skilled	  craftsmen	  can	  accurately	  tell	  
well-­‐done	  work	  from	  what	  is	  poorly	  done,	  though	  often	  they	  can’t	  explain	  their	  
judgments,	  and	  when	  asked	  about	  them	  all	  they	  can	  say	  is	  that	  the	  works	  that	  
displease	  them	  lack	  a	  certain	  je-­‐ne-­‐sais-­‐quoi.’11	  And	  it	  is	  not	  just	  ‘expert	  perception’	  
that	  can	  seem	  intangible	  in	  this	  way.	  As	  Alan	  Millar	  observes,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  a	  priori	  
reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  facility	  at	  recognizing	  people	  goes	  with	  facility	  at	  registering	  
the	  person’s	  features	  at	  the	  level	  of	  judgement’.	  What’s	  more,	  even	  if	  we	  were	  able	  
to	  identify	  the	  relevant	  visible	  features,	  this	  would	  ‘fall	  short	  of	  articulating	  that	  to	  
which	  we	  respond’	  when	  recognizing	  Bill	  by	  sight,	  viz.	  the	  ‘Gestalt	  of	  a	  face,	  or	  a	  
distinctive	  gait.’	  (2010,	  p.	  122).	  	  
	  
                                                
9   Cedric Evans  defines ‘interrogative attention’ as the ‘the attention we 
pay to an object in order to enlarge our knowledge.’(1970, p. 100) Naomi  Eilan 
suggests that perceptual attention is ‘among other things, the means by which we 
answer (..) questions about the environment.’ (1998, p. 194) According to John 
Campbell, ‘conscious attention to an object (..) affects the functional role of your 
experience of the object. Having once consciously focused on the object, you are now 
in a position to keep track of it deliberately, to answer questions about it, and to act on 
it.’ (2002, pp. 10-11)   
10   To be precise, they are unable to engage in the activity of perceptually 
attending to experienced objects. That point is not inconsistent with evidence that the 
processing underlying blindseers’ conjectures may implicate attentional mechanisms. 
(Kentridge et al. 2004)  
11   Leibniz 1989, p. 291. I’ve used Jonathan Bennett’s translation, 
available here: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/search?q=leibniz+knowledge 
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In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  idea	  that	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  capacities	  provide	  for	  
intelligible	  knowledge	  may	  begin	  to	  look	  dubious.	  Elusive	  appearances,	  you	  might	  
say,	  can	  hardly	  be	  expected	  to	  render	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  kinds	  and	  properties	  
comprehensible.	  But	  on	  reflection	  that	  would	  be	  too	  quick.	  Consider	  a	  second	  case	  
of	  ‘implicit	  telling’,	  viz.	  professional	  chicken-­‐sexing,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  philosophical	  
literature.	  The	  subject	  looks	  at	  the	  chick	  (unlike	  a	  blindseer	  she	  can	  actually	  see	  the	  
relevant	  object)	  and	  finds	  herself	  guessing	  ‘female’.	  While	  it’s	  plausible	  for	  her	  to	  
associate	  her	  (as	  it	  turns	  out,	  reliable)	  guesses	  with	  seeing	  the	  chick,	  she	  has	  no	  idea	  
what	  makes	  her	  think	  ‘female’	  rather	  than	  ‘male’.	  Note	  that	  the	  cases	  described	  by	  
Leibniz	  and	  Millar	  are	  not	  like	  that.	  The	  subjects	  are	  struggling	  to	  articulate	  the	  visual	  
appearances	  that	  prompt	  their	  judgements,	  but	  neither	  of	  them	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  any	  
doubt	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  way	  the	  object	  looks	  to	  which	  they	  are	  responsive.	  The	  
sense	  in	  which	  they	  ‘can’t	  explain	  their	  judgements’	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  utter	  
darkness	  in	  which	  blindseers	  and	  even	  ‘chicken-­‐sexers’	  find	  themselves	  when	  
reflecting	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  their	  thoughts.	  Furthermore,	  we	  should	  not	  overstate	  the	  
point	  that	  we	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  ‘register’	  recognition-­‐enabling	  features	  ‘at	  the	  level	  
of	  judgement’.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  point	  out,	  as	  is	  frequently	  and	  plausibly	  done	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  perceptual	  recognition,	  that	  we	  are	  not	  in	  general	  good	  at	  describing	  
the	  features	  by	  which	  we	  can	  tell	  kinds	  of	  things.	  (Austin	  1961	  [first	  published	  1946],	  
Price	  1953,	  Urmson	  1956)	  It	  is	  another	  to	  say,	  less	  plausibly,	  that	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  of	  
what	  they	  are.	  For	  one	  thing,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  are	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  object,	  we	  may	  
be	  able	  to	  indicate	  the	  relevant	  appearance	  by	  the	  use	  of	  perceptual	  demonstratives	  
(‘that	  colour’).	  Sometimes	  we	  may	  only	  be	  able	  to	  gesture	  towards	  a	  higher-­‐level	  
property	  or	  Gestalt	  (‘something	  about	  his	  gait’).	  Sometimes	  we	  may	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  
identifying	  appearances	  comparatively	  (‘he	  looks	  like	  Bill’).12	  	  The	  point	  that	  matters	  
is	  that	  recognition-­‐enabling	  features	  don’t	  have	  the	  status	  of	  a	  ‘theoretical	  posit’,	  
something	  the	  existence	  of	  which	  we	  hypothesize	  though	  we	  have	  no	  real	  idea	  of	  its	  
nature.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  take	  ourselves	  to	  be	  presented	  with	  such	  
features,	  and	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  articulate	  about	  their	  character	  to	  invoke	  
                                                
12   Compare Millar’s reference to the ‘gesturing character’ of 
explanations of how we can perceptually tell things. (2010, p. 123)  
20 
them	  in	  making	  our	  perceptual	  judgements	  (in	  particular,	  the	  predicates	  we	  apply	  to	  
an	  experienced	  object)	  intelligible.13	  	  
	  
Standing	  knowledge.	  The	  etymology	  of	  ‘recognition’	  suggests	  that	  prior	  cognition	  of	  
a	  finch	  is	  required	  to	  count	  as	  re-­‐cognizing	  something	  as	  a	  finch.	  It	  might	  be	  said	  that	  
what	  this	  involves	  is	  simply	  the	  standing	  capacity	  to	  discover	  whether	  a	  perceived	  
object	  is	  a	  finch	  from	  the	  features	  making	  up	  its	  sensory	  appearance.	  Arguably,	  
though,	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  that	  capacity	  in	  terms	  of	  possession	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  
standing	  knowledge.	  To	  bring	  this	  out,	  here	  is	  my	  final	  example	  of	  a	  case	  of	  ‘implicit	  
telling’	  (though	  the	  label	  is	  debatable).	  In	  ‘Imagination	  and	  Perception’,	  Strawson	  
contrasts	  the	  following	  cases:	  
	  
‘Compare	  seeing	  a	  face	  you	  think	  you	  know,	  but	  cannot	  associate	  with	  any	  
previous	  encounter	  with	  seeing	  a	  face	  you	  know	  you	  know	  and	  can	  very	  well	  
so	  associate,	  even	  though	  there	  does	  not,	  as	  you	  see	  it,	  occur	  any	  particular	  
episode	  of	  recalling	  any	  particular	  previous	  encounter.	  The	  comparison	  will	  
show	  why	  I	  say	  that	  the	  past	  perceptions	  are,	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  not	  merely	  
causally	  operative,	  but	  alive	  in	  the	  present	  perception.’	  (1974,	  p.	  59)	  
	  
                                                
13   One complication arises from the fact that we often exercise, or try to 
exercise, perceptual-recognitional capacities in less than ideal circumstances. For 
example, when your attention is attracted by something at the periphery of your visual 
field for a split second and you find yourself thinking (correctly) it was a sparrow, you 
may not be able even to gesture at any visual appearance that gave rise to your 
judgement. In some such cases, the right thing to say may be that you were not in fact 
able to exercise your capacity for recognizing sparrows but, as a result of trying to do 
so, found yourself guessing it was a sparrow. (See Millar 2010 for an illuminating 
exposition and defence of the view that ‘exercising  a perceptual-recognitional 
capacity is a success notion’: we may unsuccessfully attempt to exercise the capacity 
to recognize whether something is a sparrow, but when we do exercise it what we 
gain is knowledge.) Perhaps at least some cases of ‘implicit telling’ involve such 
attempts at recognition under extreme conditions (for example, conditions of extreme 
speed). Biederman and Shiffrar’s investigation of (real) chicken sexing seems to be in 
keeping with that interpretation. The subjects they interviewed routinely sex 1000 
chicks per hour, ‘spending less than a half second viewing the cloacal region’ where 
males and females display slightly different ‘eminences.’ (In males the eminences are 
‘convex’, in females ‘flat or concave.’) (1987, pp. 640-1). 
21 
The	  first	  case	  might	  be	  described	  by	  saying	  that	  someone’s	  face	  strikes	  you	  as	  
familiar	  or	  even	  that	  you	  ‘recognize’	  the	  face,	  in	  the	  feeble	  sense	  that	  you	  find	  
yourself	  thinking	  ‘I’ve	  met	  this	  person’,	  and	  do	  so	  as	  a	  result	  of	  some	  previous	  
encounter.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  you	  come	  to	  know	  ‘that’s	  Bill’,	  by	  exercising	  
something	  you	  apparently	  lack	  in	  the	  first	  case:	  a	  recognitional	  capacity	  for	  Bill.	  But	  
that	  is	  not	  all.	  In	  the	  second,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  say	  that	  you	  
know	  how	  Bill	  looks,	  and	  that	  this	  knowledge	  is	  reflected	  —	  ‘alive’	  in	  some	  sense	  —	  
in	  your	  judging	  and	  seeing	  that	  it	  is	  Bill.	  It	  is	  partly	  in	  the	  light	  of	  that	  standing	  
knowledge	  that	  we	  find	  your	  ability	  to	  recognize	  Bill	  intelligible.	  The	  same	  point	  
applies	  to	  the	  perceptual	  recognition	  of	  kinds	  or	  basic	  features.	  It’s	  because	  you	  
know	  what	  tiles,	  and	  blue	  things,	  look	  like	  under	  standard	  conditions	  that	  it’s	  
unsurprising	  that	  you	  can	  tell	  ‘this	  tile	  is	  blue’	  when	  you	  see	  it	  in	  good	  daylight	  right	  
in	  front	  of	  you.	  
	  
It	  might	  be	  said	  that	  all	  of	  these	  points	  are	  compatible	  with	  an	  inferentialist	  model,	  
on	  which	  thoughts	  about	  appearances	  matter	  because	  they	  provide	  us	  with	  premises	  
from	  which	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  reality.	  The	  idea	  would	  be	  that	  what	  your	  
standing	  knowledge	  of	  how	  blue	  things	  looks	  provides	  for,	  most	  immediately,	  is	  just	  
the	  recognition	  that	  the	  tile	  looks	  blue,	  from	  which,	  absent	  conflicting	  evidence,	  you	  
may	  infer	  that	  it	  is	  blue.	  One	  problem	  with	  this	  model	  is	  that	  it	  distorts	  the	  role	  
thoughts	  about	  appearances	  ordinarily	  play	  in	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Such	  thoughts	  
enable	  us	  to	  make	  our	  knowledge	  intelligible,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  right	  to	  suggest	  
that	  to	  find	  out	  what	  objects	  are	  like	  through	  perception	  we	  first	  have	  to	  form	  a	  view	  
of	  their	  sensory	  appearances.	  The	  model	  also	  raises	  familiar	  epistemological	  
concerns.	  How,	  if	  perception	  never	  enables	  us	  to	  know	  reality	  directly,	  are	  we	  
supposed	  to	  know	  that	  appearances	  provide	  good	  evidence	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  reality?	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  telling	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  the	  inferential	  model	  is	  that	  the	  capacity	  
to	  recognize	  appearances	  presupposes	  the	  capacity	  (directly)	  to	  recognize	  the	  
corresponding	  reality.	  In	  any	  given	  case,	  of	  course,	  you	  may	  reflect	  that	  something	  
looks	  blue	  while	  reserving	  judgment	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  blue.	  But	  would	  you	  be	  able	  to	  
do	  so	  without	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  tell	  directly	  that	  an	  object	  is	  blue?	  Intuitively,	  your	  
reflection	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  registering	  what	  you	  would	  take	  the	  thing’s	  colour	  to	  be	  (by	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visually	  recognizing	  it)	  if	  you	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  appearances	  to	  be	  misleading.	  
As	  Strawson	  put	  it,	  you	  ‘use’	  the	  perceptual	  claim	  you	  would	  ordinarily	  have	  made	  
without	  endorsing	  it.	  (Strawson	  1988)	  This	  analysis	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  a	  natural	  
suggestion	  about	  the	  way	  perceptual-­‐recognitional	  capacities	  are	  acquired.	  We	  are	  
not	  first	  taught	  how	  to	  tell	  the	  look	  of	  tiles	  or	  of	  the	  colour	  blue.	  Rather,	  we	  learn	  
visually	  to	  tell	  blue	  things	  or	  tiles,	  in	  doing	  which	  we	  also	  learn	  to	  recognize	  the	  
distinctive	  visual	  appearance	  that	  makes	  such	  perceptual	  identifications	  possible.	  
The	  capacity	  to	  think	  about	  these	  appearances	  would	  not	  be	  available	  independently	  
of	  the	  capacity	  for	  non-­‐inferential	  perceptual	  recognition.14	  
	  
Earlier	  I	  suggested	  that	  EP	  demands	  a	  ‘particularist’	  account	  of	  the	  way	  perception	  
vindicates	  claims	  to	  knowledge,	  an	  account	  of	  the	  ‘reassurance’	  provided	  by	  
perceptual	  explanations	  of	  knowledge	  that	  is	  not	  couched	  in	  general	  epistemic	  
terms.	  The	  obvious	  suggestion,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  (3),	  is	  that	  our	  reason	  for	  
accepting	  that	  you	  know	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue	  turns	  on	  your	  ‘specialized’	  ability	  to	  
recognize	  (hence	  come	  to	  know)	  whether	  something	  is	  blue,	  or	  a	  tile.	  We	  are	  now	  in	  
a	  position	  to	  see	  how	  that	  suggestion	  might	  be	  filled	  out.	  If	  my	  sketch	  of	  the	  
commonsense	  psychology	  of	  perceptual	  recognition	  is	  on	  the	  right	  lines,	  your	  ability	  
has	  a	  sufficiently	  rich	  ‘structure’	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  a	  mere	  disposition,	  yet	  the	  
‘structure’	  is	  sui	  generis,	  not	  reducible	  to	  general-­‐purpose	  inferential	  capacities.	  A	  
                                                
14   Compare Millar’s claim that ‘we have no independent conceptual 
grip’ on the notion of ‘sensory experiences such that it looks to us as if an F is there’ 
(2010, p. 136) — independent, that is, from our understanding of what it is to see that 
an F is there. Millar also makes a further, stronger claim that, to my mind, is less 
plausible, that the human capacity for perceptual recognition is independent of the 
ability to ‘think of appearances as such.’ (p. 123) On Millar’s account, reflective 
perceptual recognition involves a combination of not-essentially-reflective 
recognitional capacities (which are operative in reflective and non-reflective 
perceivers alike) with capacities for reflective awareness. (See Millar 2011 for a 
detailed development of this view.) I think partly as a result of his adherence to this 
view of the nature of reflective perception, Millar would be inclined to deny that what 
I called standing knowledge of the distinctive appearance of a kind or individual or 
feature is part of what makes perceptual recognition intelligible. Without being able to 
argue this here, I have two concerns about this picture: (a) it is not clear to me that we 
can offer a fully adequate response to the ‘virtus dormitiva’ objection without giving a 
central role to standing knowledge of appearances, and (b) there may be independent 
grounds for scepticism about ‘additive’ conceptions of reflective perception. (See 
Boyle 2016 for relevant discussion.) 
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noteworthy	  feature	  of	  this	  ‘structure’	  	  is	  that,	  contra	  Stroud	  and	  Williamson,	  sensory	  
experience	  ‘prior	  to	  knowledge’	  plays	  an	  essential	  epistemic	  role.	  It	  is	  because	  visual	  
experience	  presents	  you	  with	  the	  tile	  that	  you	  are	  able	  visually	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  tile	  
and	  thus	  intelligibly	  answer	  questions	  about	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  role	  of	  
sensory	  experience	  is	  strictly	  limited:	  your	  experience	  helps	  to	  make	  your	  knowledge	  
intelligible	  only	  in	  combination	  with	  your	  capacity	  for	  recognizing	  tiles	  and	  blue	  
things,	  informed	  by	  your	  standing	  knowledge	  of	  their	  distinctive	  visual	  appearances.	  
I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  a	  fundamental	  disagreement	  
between	  McDowell	  and	  Stroud,	  with	  McDowell	  affirming	  and	  Stroud	  denying	  that	  
perceptual	  knowledge	  is	  ‘based	  on	  experience’.	  My	  diagnosis	  will	  be	  that	  each	  of	  the	  
two	  positions	  is	  importantly	  right	  about	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  other.	  
	  
4.	  The	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  
Consider	  McDowell’s	  objection	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  Stroud-­‐Davidson	  view.	  That	  view	  
denies	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has,	  as	  McDowell	  puts	  it,	  a	  ‘reason-­‐giving	  
capacity’;	  it	  denies,	  specifically,	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  gives	  us	  what	  I	  earlier	  
called	  ‘knowledge-­‐providing’	  reasons	  (reasons	  for	  beliefs	  such	  that	  the	  beliefs	  can	  be	  
seen	  to	  amount	  to	  knowledge	  because	  they	  are	  held	  for	  those	  reasons).	  McDowell’s	  
objection	  is	  that	  the	  ‘Stroud-­‐Davidson’	  view	  cannot	  accommodate	  the	  distinction	  
between	  ordinary	  perceptual	  judgements	  and	  a	  (legendary)	  chicken-­‐sexer’s	  taking	  a	  
particular	  hatchling	  to	  be	  female.	  To	  mark	  the	  distinction,	  he	  maintains,	  we	  need	  the	  
notion	  of	  a	  ‘perceptual	  impression’,	  a	  perceptual	  state	  that	  does	  not	  implicate	  either	  
belief	  or	  knowledge	  but	  provides	  a	  rational	  basis	  —	  ‘something	  like	  an	  invitation’	  —	  
for	  belief.	  The	  notion	  would	  enable	  us	  to	  say	  this:	  the	  chicken-­‐sexers	  ‘cannot	  find	  in	  
their	  perceptual	  experience	  impressions	  whose	  content	  is	  that	  a	  chick	  is	  male,	  or	  
that	  it	  is	  female.’	  (McDowell	  2002,	  p.	  279)	  As	  a	  consequence,	  they	  lack	  the	  sort	  of	  
reasons	  that	  explain	  and	  warrant	  ordinary	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  On	  this	  analysis,	  the	  
‘Stroud-­‐Davidson’	  view	  is	  revisionary:	  it	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  distinction	  
commonsense	  finds	  compelling	  and	  with	  the	  part	  ‘perceptual	  impressions’	  play	  in	  
ordinary	  explanatory	  practice.	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Stroud	  is	  unmoved	  by	  this	  objection,	  and	  I	  suspect	  part	  of	  his	  diagnosis	  is	  that	  the	  
objection	  rests	  on	  an	  assumption	  that	  is	  itself	  revisionary:	  it	  projects	  ideas	  that	  have	  
their	  home	  in	  classical	  foundationalist	  epistemology	  into	  commonsense	  psychology.	  
In	  slightly	  more	  detail:	  on	  Stroud’s	  view,	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  sharply	  between	  the	  
claim	  that	  perceptual	  knowledge	  is	  ‘based	  on’	  experience	  and	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  
involves	  experience.	  Stroud	  acknowledges	  that	  we	  have	  perceptual	  experiences	  such	  
as	  the	  experience	  of	  ‘seeing	  and	  knowing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  red	  tomato	  and	  a	  plate	  
there’.	  What	  he	  denies	  is	  that	  when	  someone	  sees	  and	  knows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tomato,	  
there	  is	  a	  visual	  experience	  that	  serves	  as	  ‘the	  ground	  or	  basis	  of	  his	  knowledge	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  tomato.’	  The	  sort	  of	  experience	  we	  undoubtedly	  have	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  
‘thick	  experience’.	  It	  is	  ‘thick’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  ‘too	  close’	  to	  what	  we	  know	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  explain	  how	  we	  know	  it.	  (2013,	  pp.	  3-­‐4)15	  Stroud’s	  main	  objection	  to	  a	  ‘thin’	  
notion	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  —	  such	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘perceptual	  impression’	  in	  
McDowell’s	  sense	  —	  is	  this.	  A	  perceptual	  ‘impression’	  would	  provide	  a	  ‘basis’	  for	  our	  
knowledge	  in	  a	  sense	  akin	  to	  that	  in	  which	  the	  known	  premises	  of	  a	  valid	  argument	  
may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  ‘basis’	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  its	  conclusion.	  In	  both	  
cases,	  we	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  know	  something	  because	  we	  believe	  it	  for	  a	  good	  reason.	  
There	  is	  a	  crucial	  difference,	  however.	  The	  reason-­‐giving	  capacity	  of	  a	  perceptual	  
‘impression’	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  subject’s	  knowing,	  or	  even	  believing,	  
what	  the	  impression	  represents	  to	  be	  so.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  account	  is	  that	  it	  
extends	  the	  scope	  of	  reason-­‐giving	  explanations	  beyond	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  
such	  explanations	  intelligible.	  ‘It	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  content	  of	  a	  person’s	  experience	  
that	  gives	  the	  reason	  to	  believe	  something’,	  Stroud	  argues,	  ‘it	  is	  the	  person’s	  
experiencing,	  or	  being	  aware	  of,	  or	  accepting,	  or	  somehow	  “taking	  in”	  that	  content.’	  
(Stroud	  2002,	  p.	  89)	  Without	  your	  accepting	  that	  content,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  your	  
reason	  to	  believe	  anything,	  nor	  could	  you	  take	  it	  to	  be	  a	  reason.	  The	  putative	  ‘belief-­‐	  
(and	  knowledge-­‐)	  independence’	  of	  McDowell’s	  ‘perceptual	  impressions’	  defeats	  
                                                
15   Once again, there is a striking affinity between Stroud’s and 
Williamson’s views. Williamson suggests that ‘I can see that p’ ‘reports an experience 
only in the anodyne sense in which “I met John Boorman” reports an experience’. 
One thing that makes the sense anodyne is that one does not ‘describe what it is like 
to have the experience’. Another, I think, is that the experience does not serve as the 
ground or basis for one’s knowledge.	  In the case of ‘visual knowledge’, the correct 
explanation of how one knows is: ‘by sight’. (2009, p. 348)  
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their	  essential	  purpose,	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  understand	  perceptual	  experience’s	  ‘reason-­‐
giving	  capacity’. 
	  
I	  think	  a	  sensible	  verdict	  at	  this	  point	  is	  that	  the	  objections	  McDowell	  and	  Stroud	  are	  
trading	  with	  each	  other	  are	  both	  quite	  powerful.	  Stroud	  might	  of	  course	  insist	  that	  
the	  chicken-­‐sexers	  lack	  the	  ‘thick’	  experience	  of	  ‘seeing	  and	  knowing’	  that	  a	  
hatchling	  is	  female.	  But	  given	  that	  a	  thick	  experience	  is	  not	  thought	  to	  explain	  how	  
we	  know	  what	  we	  ‘see	  and	  know’,	  the	  question	  remains	  why	  its	  absence	  should	  
make	  perceptual	  knowledge	  unavailable	  or	  unintelligible	  in	  the	  ordinary	  way.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  it	  does	  seem	  hard	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  McDowell’s	  conception	  of	  the	  
‘reason-­‐giving	  capacity’	  of	  perceptual	  experience,	  something	  that	  (for	  one	  thing)	  
would	  be	  surprising	  if,	  as	  McDowell	  contends,	  the	  conception	  were	  so	  much	  
commonsense.16	  Might	  both	  objections	  be	  correct?	  I	  think	  the	  reason	  this	  possibility	  
tends	  to	  be	  overlooked	  lies	  in	  an	  assumption	  McDowell	  and	  Stroud	  share.	  The	  
assumption	  can	  be	  put	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  conditional:	  	  
	  
if	  perceptual	  experience	  plays	  a	  distinctive	  explanatory	  role	  in	  ordinary	  
explanations	  of	  how	  we	  know	  what	  we	  know	  through	  perception,	  
commonsense	  conceives	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  as	  an	  epistemic	  basis	  for	  
beliefs	  (in	  the	  light	  of	  which	  such	  beliefs	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  qualify	  as	  
knowledge).	  	  
	  
McDowell	  accepts	  the	  antecedent,	  and	  argues	  by	  modus	  ponens.	  Stroud	  rejects	  the	  
consequent,	  and	  argues	  by	  modus	  tollens.	  Neither	  of	  them,	  however,	  offers	  any	  
reason	  for	  accepting	  the	  conditional.	  Suppose	  we	  reject	  it.	  Then	  we	  can	  agree	  with	  
McDowell	  that	  sensory	  experience	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  accounting	  for	  
perceptual	  knowledge.	  Without	  experience	  of	  objects	  (as	  in	  blindsight)	  or	  
recognition-­‐enabling	  features	  (as	  in	  chicken-­‐sexing)	  intelligible	  perceptual	  
recognition	  is	  impossible.	  We	  can	  also	  agree	  with	  Stroud	  that	  when	  someone	  makes	  
an	  observational	  judgement,	  ‘no	  experience	  serves	  as	  his	  ground	  or	  reason	  for	  
                                                
16   For critical discussion of this aspect of McDowell’s account, see 
Travis 2004, Ginsborg 2006, Roessler 2009, Giananti 2019.  
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claiming	  or	  judging	  as	  he	  does’	  —	  at	  least	  if	  by	  ‘ground	  or	  reason’	  we	  mean	  what	  
McDowell	  means	  by	  it,	  viz.	  a	  reason	  responsiveness	  to	  which	  would	  explain	  how	  he	  
knows	  what	  he	  knows.	  In	  another	  sense,	  though,	  experience	  does	  provide	  a	  ‘ground	  
or	  reason’.	  By	  contributing	  to	  a	  vindicatory	  explanation	  of	  his	  knowledge,	  it	  provides	  
a	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  what	  he	  has	  	  is	  indeed	  knowledge.	  In	  that	  sense,	  
McDowell	  is	  right	  to	  insist	  that	  sensory	  experience	  has	  a	  ‘reason-­‐giving	  capacity’.	  
	  
5.	  Perceptual	  warrant:	  the	  manifest	  vs	  the	  philosophical	  image	  
One	  question	  defenders	  of	  McDowell’s	  account	  will	  press	  is	  how,	  if	  we	  abandon	  the	  
idea	  of	  ‘perceptual	  impressions’	  that	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  we	  are	  to	  
explain	  the	  rationality	  of	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  Knowing	  entails	  believing,	  and,	  in	  
rational	  subjects,	  believing	  for	  good	  reasons.	  How	  can	  EP	  respect	  this?	  This	  is	  one	  
complaint	  that	  might	  be	  made	  under	  the	  general	  heading	  of	  ‘perceptual	  warrant’.	  
Another	  is	  this.	  There	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  methodological	  disjunctivism	  built	  into	  EP.	  It	  
approaches	  the	  relation	  between	  perceiving	  and	  believing	  by	  narrowly	  focusing	  on	  
‘good’	  cases,	  in	  which	  perception	  yields	  knowledge,	  not	  just	  belief.	  But	  perception	  
also	  causes	  and	  warrants	  ‘mere’	  beliefs,	  as	  when	  odd	  lighting	  condition	  mislead	  you	  
about	  the	  colour	  of	  a	  white	  tile.	  How	  is	  it	  that	  it	  can	  be	  perfectly	  reasonable,	  in	  such	  
circumstances,	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue?	  	  
	  
I	  don't	  want	  to	  minimize	  the	  importance	  or	  difficulty	  of	  these	  issues,	  but	  I	  think	  so	  
long	  as	  our	  interest	  is	  merely	  in	  articulating	  ordinary	  explanatory	  practice	  they	  pose	  
no	  very	  serious	  challenge.	  Put	  in	  general	  terms,	  the	  obvious	  response	  is	  that	  
questions	  about	  our	  warrant	  for	  perceptual	  beliefs	  should	  be	  approached	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  our	  independent	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘vindicatory	  role’	  of	  perception.	  What	  
makes	  your	  belief	  that	  the	  tile	  is	  blue	  rational,	  when	  the	  blue	  tile	  is	  right	  in	  front	  of	  
you	  in	  good	  daylight,	  is	  that	  you	  have	  a	  conclusive	  reason	  for	  it:	  you	  can	  see	  it’s	  blue.	  
As	  Stroud	  remarks,	  ‘(t)here	  is	  no	  better	  reason	  for	  believing	  and	  claiming	  to	  know	  
that	  p	  than	  seeing	  or	  otherwise	  perceiving	  that	  p.’	  (2009,	  p.	  566)	  True,	  the	  reason	  
would	  not	  be	  available	  to	  you	  if	  you	  were	  not	  aware	  that	  you	  can	  see	  the	  tile	  to	  be	  
blue.	  But	  arguably,	  it	  is	  no	  accident	  that	  if	  a	  rational	  subject	  visually	  recognizes	  an	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object	  she	  will	  ordinarily	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  she	  recognizes	  the	  object.17	  In	  
turn,	  this	  account	  may	  help	  to	  understand	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  ‘mere’	  perceptual	  
beliefs	  can	  be	  reasonable.	  That	  you	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  unusual	  lighting	  conditions	  
explains	  (and	  excuses)	  your	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  you’re	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  you	  
can	  visually	  tell	  the	  tile’s	  colour.	  That	  the	  tile	  is	  looking	  bright	  blue	  to	  you	  explains	  
(and	  excuses)	  your	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  you	  are	  able	  to	  tell	  it’s	  blue,	  and	  hence	  your	  
belief	  that	  it	  is	  blue.	  (See	  Millar	  2011)	  
	  
Both	  suggestions	  (even	  if	  properly	  elaborated)	  will	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  detailed	  
concerns.	  But	  I	  think	  the	  reason	  they	  are	  bound	  to	  strike	  many	  as	  unsatisfactory	  is	  
not	  a	  matter	  of	  detail	  but	  of	  principle.	  They	  violate	  a	  maxim	  almost	  universally	  
acknowledged	  in	  epistemology,	  that	  if	  you	  know	  that	  p	  through	  perception	  it	  must	  
be	  possible	  to	  give	  an	  independent	  account	  of	  how	  your	  perception	  warrants	  your	  
belief	  that	  p.	  Let’s	  call	  this	  the	  explanatory	  priority	  of	  perceptual	  warrant	  (PPW).	  
There	  are	  different	  perspectives	  from	  which	  one	  may	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  
popularity	  of	  PPW.	  From	  one	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  can	  seem	  as	  if	  there	  are	  simply	  a	  
variety	  of	  quite	  heterogeneous	  traditions	  and	  concerns	  in	  epistemology	  that	  happen	  
to	  converge	  on	  PPW.	  One	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  its	  appeal,	  for	  example,	  is	  surely	  the	  
traditional	  view	  that	  knowledge	  can	  be	  reductively	  analyzed	  as	  warranted	  true	  
belief.	  That	  view	  makes	  it	  utterly	  natural	  to	  assume	  that	  explaining	  how	  you	  know	  
that	  p	  can	  only	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  explaining	  how	  your	  true	  belief	  comes	  to	  be	  
warranted	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  Another	  source	  may	  be	  a	  traditional,	  ‘narrow’	  view	  
of	  the	  nature	  of	  sensory	  experience.	  If,	  as	  the	  ‘slightest	  philosophy’	  supposedly	  
teaches	  us,	  ‘nothing	  can	  ever	  be	  present	  to	  the	  mind	  but	  an	  image	  or	  perception’	  
(Hume	  1975,	  p.	  152),	  sensory	  experience	  could	  not	  intelligibly	  put	  us	  in	  a	  position	  
non-­‐inferentially	  to	  tell	  what	  mind-­‐independent	  objects	  are	  like.	  The	  only	  role	  it	  
could	  conceivably	  play	  in	  making	  knowledge	  of	  objects	  possible	  would	  be	  that	  of	  
contributing	  in	  some	  way	  to	  our	  justification	  for	  forming	  beliefs	  about	  objects.	   
                                                
17   See Millar 2011 for a version of this idea, which appeals to the notion 
of a ‘second-order perceptual-recognitional capacity.’ An alternative version, I think, 
is implicit in the discussion of the previous section: roughly, the idea would be that 




The	  various	  traditions	  that	  may	  be	  responsible	  for	  PPW’s	  popularity	  would	  all	  
deserve	  detailed	  attention.	  But	  here	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  
that	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  adopted	  in	  thinking	  about	  PPW.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  way	  of	  
motivating	  PPW	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  contentious	  doctrines	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
propositional	  knowledge	  or	  perceptual	  experience.	  A	  commitment	  to	  the	  principle,	  it	  
may	  be	  argued,	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  project	  of	  achieving	  a	  philosophical	  
understanding	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge,	  at	  least	  if	  epistemology	  is	  to	  be	  the	  ‘critical’	  
discipline	  it	  has	  traditionally	  aspired	  to	  be.	  The	  route	  to	  PPW	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  would	  
involve	  two	  steps.	  The	  first	  step	  would	  insist	  that	  epistemology	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  
what	  might	  be	  called	  ‘descriptive	  epistemology’.	  The	  latter,	  to	  adapt	  Strawson’s	  
explication	  of	  ‘descriptive	  metaphysics’	  (1959,	  p.	  9),	  aims	  to	  ‘describe	  the	  actual	  
structure	  of	  our	  thinking’	  about	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Without	  diminishing	  the	  
value	  of	  that	  exercise,	  it	  cannot,	  by	  itself,	  answer	  epistemology’s	  question,	  which	  is:	  
how	  does	  perception	  provide	  us	  with	  knowledge	  of	  (and	  justified	  beliefs	  about)	  
mind-­‐independent	  objects?	  This	  is	  not	  a	  question	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  ordinary	  
thinking	  about	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  It	  is,	  simply,	  a	  philosophical	  question	  about	  
perceptual	  knowledge	  itself.	  The	  second	  step	  would	  add	  that	  not	  only	  is	  the	  question	  
not	  about	  commonsense	  psychology,	  but	  it	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  be	  answered	  simply	  
by	  rehearsing	  commonsense	  psychology.	  We	  may	  ordinarily	  take	  it	  that	  seeing	  the	  
tile	  will	  enable	  a	  (suitably	  equipped)	  perceiver	  to	  tell	  that	  it’s	  a	  blue	  tile.	  But	  
epistemology	  should	  stand	  back	  and	  ask	  whether	  we	  are	  right	  about	  this.	  That	  
enterprise	  would	  be	  greatly	  facilitated	  if	  we	  had	  a	  definition	  or	  reductive	  analysis	  of	  
knowledge,	  ideally	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  belief	  that	  meets	  certain	  further	  conditions.	  We	  could	  
then	  simply	  ask	  whether	  perception	  provides	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  necessary	  
and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  knowledge.18	  But	  even	  if	  we	  lack	  a	  definition	  of	  
knowledge,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  the	  way	  to	  probe	  perceptual	  explanations	  of	  
                                                
18   The attraction of simultaneously understanding the nature of 
knowledge and the way vindicatory explanations of knowledge work may be 
responsible for the tendency for ‘what the press corps calls mission creep’ that John 
Hyman discerns in contemporary work on the nature of knowledge: ‘We start out 
wanting to say what knowledge is; but we quickly find ourselves embroiled in the 
question of how it can be acquired. And before long we have to evacuate by 
helicopter, leaving chaos behind us.’ (1999, p. 435) 
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how	  we	  know	  what	  objects	  are	  like	  is	  to	  compare	  them	  with	  what	  we	  have	  
independent	  reason	  to	  regard	  as	  the	  prototype	  of	  a	  vindicatory	  explanation	  of	  
knowledge,	  in	  terms	  of	  conclusive	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  Whether	  perception	  can	  
explain	  and	  vindicate	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us,	  in	  the	  end,	  depends	  on	  
whether	  it	  resembles	  the	  prototype	  in	  relevant	  ways.	  Internalists	  and	  externalists	  
have	  different	  ideas	  about	  what	  counts	  as	  relevant	  similarity	  here,	  but	  they	  agree	  
that	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  you	  come	  to	  believe	  something	  in	  a	  way	  that	  explains	  how	  
you	  are	  warranted	  in	  believing	  it.	  
	  
The	  suggestion,	  then,	  is	  that	  what	  I	  called	  a	  ‘generalist’	  approach	  to	  perceptual	  
knowledge	  (in	  section	  2)	  is	  unavoidable	  if	  we	  are	  to	  take	  the	  philosophical	  question	  
seriously.	  We	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perception	  in	  
terms	  we	  have	  independent	  reason	  to	  think	  yield	  vindicatory	  explanations.	  In	  
contrast,	  as	  I	  emphasized,	  ordinary	  explanatory	  practice,	  as	  represented	  by	  EP,	  is	  
incorrigibly	  ‘particularist’.	  It	  makes	  our	  knowledge	  of	  objects	  intelligible	  by	  reference	  
to	  specialized	  perceptual-­‐epistemic	  skills	  rather	  than	  general-­‐purpose	  capacities,	  
such	  as	  responsiveness	  to	  evidence	  or	  reliable	  belief-­‐forming	  dispositions.	  The	  
exercise	  of	  the	  specialized	  skill	  is	  seen	  as	  sufficient	  for	  knowledge,	  despite	  being,	  as	  
Williamson	  puts	  it,	  highly	  unnecessary.	  (2009,	  p.	  359)	  	  
	  
I	  think	  the	  two-­‐step	  route	  to	  PPW	  captures	  something	  of	  the	  spirit	  in	  which	  work	  on	  
perceptual	  warrant	  is	  commonly	  conducted.	  I	  will	  leave	  open	  whether	  a	  case	  for	  
PPW	  along	  these	  lines	  is	  convincing,	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  free	  of	  contentious	  
assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  perception	  or	  propositional	  knowledge.19	  But	  I	  
want	  to	  conclude	  by	  indicating	  grounds	  for	  scepticism,	  not	  about	  the	  philosophical	  
project	  itself	  but	  about	  its	  chances	  of	  corroborating	  our	  everyday	  thinking	  about	  
                                                
19   If so, this would be one way in which the two-step route to PPW 
differs from Stroud’s suggestive discussion of the sources of what he describes as the 
philosophical project of giving a ‘completely general’ explanation of our knowledge 
of the world around us, despite similarities in other respects. (Stroud 2000, esp. essays 
8 and 10) At least some of his formulations suggest that according to Stroud, a central 
commitment of the philosophical project is a certain view of sense perception, one on 
which ‘we could perceive exactly what we perceive now even if there were no 
material world at all’ (2000, p. 102)  
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perceptual	  knowledge.	  Philosophers	  differ	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  are	  interested	  
in	  the	  latter.	  Sometimes	  commonsense	  merely	  figures	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  ‘intuitions’	  
used	  to	  prompt	  epistemological	  theorizing.	  But	  many	  theorists	  of	  perceptual	  warrant	  
think	  of	  their	  work	  as	  something	  that	  will	  deepen	  and	  validate	  our	  ordinary	  practice	  
of	  explaining	  knowledge	  by	  reference	  to	  perception.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  if	  EP	  is	  
correct,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  sufficiently	  profound	  dissonance	  between	  the	  
perspective	  of	  commonsense	  and	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  philosophical	  project	  to	  
scupper	  the	  prospect	  of	  any	  such	  validation.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  ‘gap	  or	  dislocation’	  
here,	  akin	  to	  the	  one	  Bernard	  Williams	  identifies	  in	  the	  enterprise	  of	  justifying	  
ordinary	  ethical	  thinking	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  utilitarian	  theory:	  a	  ‘gap	  or	  dislocation	  
between	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  theory	  itself	  and	  the	  spirit	  it	  supposedly	  justifies.’	  (Williams	  
1985,	  p.	  108)	  The	  spirit	  of	  commonsense	  psychology	  says	  that	  the	  best	  (though	  of	  
course	  not	  the	  only)	  way	  to	  convince	  others	  that	  one	  knows	  that	  a	  certain	  tile	  is	  blue	  
would	  be	  to	  invite	  them	  to	  look	  at	  the	  tile,	  something	  that	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  
recognize	  both	  the	  tile’s	  colour	  and	  the	  justice	  of	  one’s	  claim	  to	  knowledge.	  The	  
spirit	  of	  epistemology	  says	  that	  there	  cannot	  be	  any	  really	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  
one’s	  attitude	  is	  knowledge	  without	  an	  independent	  account	  of	  how	  one’s	  visual	  
experience	  helps	  to	  warrant	  one’s	  belief.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  there	  is	  a	  straightforward	  
conflict	  here	  over	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  for	  crediting	  ourselves	  and	  others	  with	  
knowledge.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  ‘dislocation’,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  
epistemologists	  have	  sought	  to	  domesticate	  commonsense,	  by	  analyzing	  everyday	  
explanatory	  practice	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  belief-­‐centred	  schema,	  internalist	  or	  
externalist.	  But	  the	  desire	  to	  avert	  the	  threat	  of	  ‘dislocation’	  would	  not	  be	  a	  good	  
reason	  for	  accepting	  any	  such	  analysis.	  There	  is	  an	  obvious	  risk	  here	  of	  
surreptitiously	  retrojecting	  a	  revisionary	  philosophical	  theory	  into	  commonsense	  
psychology.20	  	  
                                                
20   I borrow the term from Janet Broughton’s suggestion that Descartes 
‘retrojects’ some of the metaphysical and epistemological results reached in 
Meditation VI into the putatively commonsensical view the meditator finds himself 
holding at the beginning of Meditation I. (Broughton 2003, p. 31) See also Stroud’s 
discussion of the risk of ‘metaphysical conviction’ leading to ‘distortion or 
misunderstanding’ of our everyday ways of thinking. (Stroud 2011b, p. 15) A nice 
example of the retrojection of a revisionary philosophical theory into commonsense is 
provided by William Kneale’s gloss on Locke’s theory of secondary qualities: ‘When 
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To	  say	  that	  pursuit	  of	  the	  philosophical	  question	  cannot	  succeed	  in	  validating	  our	  
everyday	  thinking	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  to	  say	  that	  it	  cannot	  succeed	  at	  all.	  It	  might	  
succeed,	  for	  example,	  in	  debunking	  our	  everyday	  thinking.	  Colour	  provides	  an	  
analogy	  here.	  On	  one	  analysis,	  we	  ordinarily	  take	  it	  that	  the	  colours	  of	  objects,	  which	  
we	  conceive	  neither	  as	  dispositions	  nor	  as	  microphysical	  properties,	  explain	  the	  
experience	  we	  enjoy	  when	  we	  perceive	  colours.	  The	  manifest	  image,	  thus	  described,	  
might	  then	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  superseded	  by	  vision	  science.	  It	  may	  be	  said,	  
similarly,	  that	  the	  commonsensical	  notion	  that	  we	  find	  out	  what	  objects	  are	  like	  by	  
deploying	  capacities	  for	  perceptual	  recognition	  has	  been	  debunked	  by	  epistemology,	  
which	  reveals	  that	  the	  explanation	  and	  vindication	  of	  our	  knowledge	  in	  fact	  turns	  on	  
whether	  and	  how	  perception	  warrants	  our	  beliefs.	  This	  would	  obviously	  be	  to	  place	  a	  
lot	  of	  confidence	  in	  PPW.	  One	  important	  question	  would	  be	  whether	  the	  case	  for	  
PPW	  is	  strong	  enough	  to	  warrant	  that	  confidence.	  But	  a	  successful	  debunking	  
manoeuvre	  would	  also	  depend	  on	  another	  condition.	  It	  would	  require	  that	  
jettisoning	  the	  commonsense	  psychology	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  would	  not	  take	  
with	  it	  too	  much	  —	  nothing,	  at	  least,	  that’s	  indispensable	  for	  human	  thought	  and	  
knowledge.	  That	  condition	  would	  also	  deserve	  careful	  scrutiny.	  As	  in	  other	  areas21,	  




                                                                                                                                       
Locke said that the secondary qualities were powers in things to produce sensations in 
us, he stated the facts correctly, but he did not realize that his statement was only an 
analysis of the plain man’s use of secondary quality adjectives.’ (Kneale 1950, p. 123) 
I owe this quote to Keith Allen’s illuminating discussion of what he calls the ‘Oxford 
view of colour’, in Allen 2007.  
21   Compare Stroud’s discussion of modal, causal and evaluative thinking 
in his 2011b.  
22   For helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper I’m grateful to 
Lucy Campbell, Naomi Eilan, Andrea Giananti, Thor Grünbaum, David Hunter, 
Hemdat Lerman, Guy Longworth, Mike Martin, Krisztina Orban, Eylem Özaltun, 
Christoph Pfisterer, Stefan Riegelnik, Barney Walker and Hong-Yu Wong. Special 
thanks to the participants at a workshop at the University of Roma Tre (some time 
ago) who helped me to get started on this paper. I’ve presented versions of the paper 
at conferences or colloquia at Salzburg, Southampton, Warwick, Tübingen, Kirchberg 
am Wechsel and Zürich. I’m grateful to the audiences for suggestions and comments.  
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